Mr Kevin Yiwei Huang1
1Australian National University, Australia
Biography:
Kevin Yiwei Huang is a PhD Candidate at the Australian National University Crawford School of Public Policy. His research focuses on the intersection of technology and great power rivalry. Drawing on a multidisciplinary professional and academic background spanning industrial engineering, human-robot interaction research, and strategic studies, Kevin’s work seeks to develop novel conceptual frameworks for understanding the complex dynamics of technological competition and its implications for the international order. His current project examines the interplay of competitive strategies across multiple cases of great power technological rivalry, aiming to generate new theoretical and policy insights.
Abstract:
This paper examines technological competition between the United States and China in the semiconductor industry, addressing why these great powers adopt different competitive strategies. Drawing on a novel Development/Suppression Model of technological competition, this study categorises strategies along two axes: efforts to enhance domestic capabilities (development) and efforts to constrain rivals’ capabilities (suppression), tracing the evolution of US and Chinese technology strategies from 1990-2024.
The findings reveal divergent trajectories. The US has shifted toward a comprehensive Dominance Strategy, simultaneously advancing domestic capabilities while systematically constraining China’s semiconductor access and growth. Conversely, China has pursued an intensive Acceleration Strategy, focusing on indigenous development to challenge US technological dominance and achieve greater self-sufficiency.
The analysis reveals that these divergent strategies stem from three key factors: (1) strong elite consensus in both countries regarding semiconductors’ strategic value; (2) converging technological capabilities intensifying competitive pressures; and (3) differential positions within global semiconductor networks, with the US leveraging its central position as the techno-political leader to enable suppression-based policies while China’s peripheral position constrains such options.
By decoding this high-stakes technological rivalry, the research contributes to theoretical debates on technology’s role in international relations while offering policy-relevant insights into managing the growing centrality of technological competition in 21st-century geopolitics.